## 1AC

#### conspiracy

## 2AC

### Case

#### Epistemic commitments determine ontological outlooks and predictive results—prior critique is necessary to stave off banal instrumentality and institutional bias

Stanley ’12 Liam Stanley, “Rethinking the Definition and Role of Ontology in Political Science,” Politics, Vol. 32 (2), p. 93-99, 2012

The literature says very little directly on the subject of how ontological assumptions emerge (Hay, 2005, p. 41). In many ways, this is unsurprising, particularly because it is not possible to conduct such an analysis without first committing to a series of ontological and epistemological assumptions (which I, of course, must also make in the remainder of the article). This inescapable irony is noted, but should not prevent the endeavour altogether because otherwise such discussions would not even be possible. Nevertheless, in regard to how political scientists make ontological assumptions some preliminary answers can be gathered from reading the literature from in between the lines. While the literature often rightly claims that ontological dualisms are perennial problematiques with no solution (Hay, 2006, p. 82; Jenkins, 2005, p. 6), they also tend somewhat paradoxically to offer conceptual refinements to these unsolvable dichotomies: e.g. structure–agency (McAnulla, 2002), material– ideational (e.g. Marsh, 2009), mind–body (e.g. Jenkins, 2005). So, the question becomes, if ontological dualisms cannot be solved then why do political scientists seek to offer increasingly complex conceptualisations? It is presumably because such problematiques allow political scientists to reflect on their own assumptions, as well as the assumptions of others, and avoid making the simplistic structuralist or intentionalist mistakes of yesteryear. Such simplistic underpinnings should indeed be critiqued on the basis of unrealistically limiting the potential for human agency or failing to consider how structures favour certain actors and strategies. But the value of incrementally more complex conceptualisations is rarely justified through this. Furthermore, in tandem with the ideal-type of the directional dependence, this aspect of the literature also implies that ontological assumptions should emerge from engagement with philosophically oriented literature. Yet there is little reflection on whether this ideal-type accurately reflects academic practice and, more importantly, whether this would have any implications for foundations of their arguments. A second reading of the directional dependence model could also imply that ontological assumptions sometimes derive from epistemological decisions (Hay, 2006, p. 92). This is why the directional dependence model outlined earlier is important, because it demonstrates how seemingly innocuous epistemological or methodological decisions can influence assumptions about social reality. If some ontological assumptions are inextricably tied up with epistemological decisions, then the next step should involve the analysis of the process that, in part, gives rise to epistemological assumptions. This section aims to do just that. Epistemological decisions can influence or generate ontological assumptions. Colin Hay (Hay, 2006, p. 92) has shown the adverse affects of searching for generalisable knowledge (an epistemological decision) on the ontological assumptions and resulting explanations of rational choice theory. Yet, the extent of epistemological decision-making extends beyond the understandable ambition to theorize politics. It is sometimes influenced by academic norms emerging from the discipline as well as regulatory and funding bodies. One possible criticism of the literature on ontology is that it is irrelevant to the majority of political scientists who are driven by a ‘mundane instrumentality’ in which ‘what counts is what works’ (Bale, 2006, p. 102). Yet, this mundane instrumentality often manifests itself in the form of epistemological decisions, which may then influence ontological assumptions. Other researchers have made similar arguments, albeit not directly. For instance, Alan Bryman (2007) argues that the quantitative–qualitative ‘paradigm wars’ have been superseded by a certain ontological and epistemological pragmatism in which philosophical reflection is rendered obsolete in the pursuit of further funding and publications. When interviewing a n\\umber of leading social scientists Bryman (2007, p. 17) found that: ‘when asked about how far epistemological and ontological issues concerned them, most interviewees depicted themselves as pragmatists who felt it necessary to put aside such issues to secure funding for their research interests and to publish their findings’. Meanwhile, Clare Donovan’s (2005) analysis starts from the observation that nonpolitical scientists, who often impose inappropriate regulation in adjudicating the strength of research, regulate the discipline. The consequence, for Donovan, is the rise of a ‘slave social science’ in which positivism, the epistemological approach most associated with natural science, becomes dominant despite, perhaps, the misgivings some may have over its ontological ramifications. This suggests that ontological assumptions do not necessarily emerge from conscious deliberation with solutions to philosophical dualisms but are inextricably linked to a number of factors including the (perceived) epistemological biases of regulatory and funding bodies.

### Wilderson K

#### Encourages human rights abuses and terrorism

Pigden 7 [professor of philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand and is the editor of Russell on Ethics (2007, Charles, “Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom”, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2, 219-232, Project Muse) AMB

Most political crimes, from disappearances and illegal bombing campaigns down to breaking peaceniks' noses or burglarizing the campaign headquarters of [End Page 225] the opposition party,9 are the products of conspiracy. Thus if conspiracy theories are theories that posit conspiracies, then if we adopted the principle that we should not believe and should not investigate conspiracy theories, we could not hold anyone responsible for such crimes. For to do so would be to accept some conspiracy theory or other. This would be an epistemic disaster, since our understanding of the political scene would dissolve in a mist of skepticism broken by islands of obvious fact. We could believe in the dead bodies but not that anyone had conspired to kill them; believe in the missing money, but not in the felonious theft. And it would a political disaster, since it would confer immunity on political criminals of all sorts, from the perpetrators of genocide down to bribe-taking congressmen. We could not punish people for crimes that we were not entitled to believe in or investigate. Thus it would be both politically and epistemically irrational to adopt the strategy of not believing in and not investigating conspiracy theories. So the conventional wisdom is wrong, and it is not the case that we ought not to believe and ought not to investigate such theories. When it comes to conspiracy theories, we are within our rights as rational beings not only to investigate them, but actually to believe in them, if that is what the evidence suggests. Again it is worth stressing just how catastrophic the strategy of conspiratorial skepticism would be if we applied it consistently, rather than using it from time to time to get out of political difficulties or to rubbish allegations that we find inconvenient. To begin with, the political world would be largely unintelligible. We would be officially debarred from understanding coups, or the crimes of terrorists as intentional actions, since in both cases the intentions behind the overt acts are formulated in secret. Hence they cannot be understood as intentional acts without resorting to conspiracy. We could all acknowledge that the bombs had gone off, but we could not suppose that someone had planted them, since that would be a conspiracy theory. We could accept that two planes had hit the Twin Towers, but we could not allow ourselves to suppose they had been hijacked and deliberately crashed, since that could not have happened without a conspiracy. The nightly news would be bobbing with islands of unintelligibility, since we would be officially debarred from understanding any action involving secret plans. (I defy anyone to make sense of recent events in Iraq without taking account of the orgy of plotting that undoubtedly goes on. Death squads don't advertise their plans, neither do guerillas, gangsters, terrorists or devious politicians.) We would be allowed to understand natural phenomena and open actions, openly arrived at. And we might even treat ourselves to unintended consequences provided these did not involve secret plotting. But we would be officially blind to covert actions and secret plans. This would not quite be epistemic suicide, since there are some events within the political sphere that we would be allowed to understand. But to adopt the strategy of conspiratorial skepticism would be the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation and hence not a rational thing to do. But epistemically disastrous as conspiratorial skepticism would be, its political consequences would be catastrophic. For when it comes to conspiracy we would [End Page 226] be both officially blind and officially incurious. Under this regime, Woodward and Bernstein would not have been allowed to investigate Watergate, and even if they had, nobody would have been rationally entitled to believe their results. Nixon would have gotten away with his crimes. For if conspiracy theories were taboo, there could be no question of impeaching the President for "high crimes and misdemeanors", since most of those high crimes and misdemeanors were planned and executed in secret. The career of an investigative journalist like Seymour Hersh would stand condemned as one long exercise in irrationality since investigative journalism largely consists of investigating conspiracies and exposing them to the public gaze. If it is irrational to check out conspiracy theories, then the investigative part is a crime against reason, and if it is irrational to believe them, then the journalistic part is a crime against reason too, since it often consists in writing up conspiracy theories so as to encourage belief in the reader. One of the biggest problems with human rights abuses is impunity. Because the goons and their masters can usually get away with murder or worse,10 they have no compelling reason to cease and desist. But since most human rights abuses are the products of conspiracy, if we adopted the strategy of neither investigating nor believing conspiracy theories, impunity would become rationally sacrosanct. We could not investigate human rights abuses since, for the most part, this involves investigating conspiracy theories, and even if we could, we could not condemn their perpetrators, since to do that we would have to accept a conspiracy theory. Conspiratorial skepticism would provide the torturers and killers with a charter of impunity since it would become an epistemic no-no to shine a light into the dark places where they commit their crimes. Terrorists too would be immune from investigation, let alone conviction, since their crimes are usually planned in secret. More generally, it is a platitude of liberal democracy that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. At least part of what this means is that we must beware of power-hungry politicians conspiring to deprive us of our liberties. But if we were not allowed to investigate conspiracy theories then our vigilance would be confined to the public actions of politicians rather than their secret plans. We would have become officially blind to some of the most serious threats to liberty. And even if we somehow discovered such a conspiracy we would not be allowed to act on that discovery, since we could not act on a theory we had debarred ourselves from believing. According to Edmund Burke, "There is no safety for honest men except by believing all possible evil of evil men." But if the conventional wisdom is correct, we should not believe in the evil of evil men unless that evil is out in the open! Thus if you hate the freedoms of a democratic society, you should cultivate the opinion that conspiracy theories are unbelievable. Conversely, if you want to strike a blow for liberty (or if you want to be able to see the threats to liberty in order to be capable of striking a blow for it), this is a thesis you that should reject. [End Page 227]

#### Real violence disad—bad epistemology, you are complacent with the worst forms of state violence

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The absolute version of this strategy would be less bizarre but more catastrophic: less bizarre because what is rational to believe would not vary from place to place; more catastrophic because it would debar us from believing in evil conspiracies on the part of governments anywhere if those theories were inconsistent with some official view. Bad news for Amnesty International, bad news for their clients the world over as they are imprisoned, beaten, murdered and tortured, since you can't write letters on behalf of people whose problems you are not allowed to believe in. But I need not spill any more ink denouncing a strategy that nobody seriously advocates. For the concept of a conspiracy theory as it is commonly employed is a chauvinist construct. It is not to be understood in terms of governments generally, but in terms of Western governments, and recent Western governments at that. When people say or imply that conspiracy theories ought not to be believed, what they actually mean (in so far as they have a coherent idea) is that we should not believe theories that postulate evil schemes on the part of recent or contemporary Western governments (or government agencies) and that run counter to the current orthodoxy in the relevant Western countries. Thus you can believe that Saddam had successfully conspired to acquire nuclear weapons since the chief conspirator in this particular drama was not a member of a Western government. And you can believe that members of the Reagan administration conspired to evade the Boland Amendment by selling arms to Iran to finance the [End Page 229] Contras, since the existence of this conspiracy is currently consistent with received opinion. But you must not believe that Bush considered bombing Al Jazeera (let alone that the earlier bombings of Al Jazeera offices were intentional) for that theory involves evil schemes on the part of a Western leader and contradicts the official view. Is this a sensible belief-forming strategy? Obviously not. An epistemic strategy should maximize the chances of truth and minimize the chances of error. But if this strategy had been pursued in the past, many politically important truths would never have come to light. For there are many theories that are not conspiracy theories now, though they were conspiracy theories in the past: the theory that the Kennedy administration conspired to overthrow Diem, the theory that CREEP conspired to burglarize the Democratic headquarters in the Watergate building, the theory that members of the Reagan administration conspired to sell weapons to Iran in order to fund the Contras.12 All these theories were once inconsistent with official opinion, though nowadays official opinion has managed to catch up with the facts. Thus it would have been an epistemic mistake to have adopted this strategy in the past. More importantly, it would have been a political mistake. If these activities had gone unnoticed, there would have been no check on the abuse of Presidential power, which would probably have gone on to worse excesses. The price of liberty is eternal vigilance. The revised strategy would have sent us to sleep. Thus the conventional wisdom has proved to be unwise. On any of the readings of "conspiracy theory" that I have been able to come up with, it is not the case that we should neither believe nor investigate conspiracy theories. If you wish to vindicate the conventional wisdom, you must do two things. First you must give an interpretation of the term "conspiracy theory" with roughly the right extension. (Most of the theories castigated as "conspiracy theories" must qualify as such, and most of the conspiracy-postulating theories that conspiracy skeptics believe in must not.) You must then show that on this interpretation, the strategy of neither investigating nor believing in conspiracies makes epistemic sense. Until this is done, the idea that conspiracy theories as such are intellectually suspect is a superstition that can be safely dismissed.

#### Rejecting conspiracy theories destroys education and history as an academic discipline, means we can’t understand the history of oppression in debate

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History, as we know it, both from documentary evidence and the best historians, is choc-a-bloc with conspiracies. Thus if conspiracy theories are theories that [End Page 224] posit conspiracies, then to accept the conventional wisdom and adopt the principle that we ought not believe or investigate conspiracy theories would lead to the conclusion that history is bunk, that much of what we thought we knew is not only unbelievable, but not worth investigating. Much of recorded history would dissolve into a blur of inexplicable events, indeed events we should not even try to explicate. To adopt this principle would be to commit historical suicide or at least self-mutilation, to make large chunks of history unbelievable and hence unknowable, since knowledge requires belief. It would maim, if not destroy, history as an intellectual discipline. But it is not rational to adopt an epistemic principle with such catastrophic consequences. Therefore it is not rational to suppose that we should not believe or even investigate conspiracy theories. Perhaps it is worth stressing how catastrophic this principle would be, if consistently practiced. (In fact nobody does this; rather people like Blair apply it in a haphazard way when it happens to suit their political purposes.) We would be entitled to believe that large quantities of gunpowder were discovered in the cellars of Parliament in 1605, but not that Guy Fawkes and his confederates put it there, for that would be a conspiracy theory. We could accept that Lord Darnley died, but not that anybody killed him, since all the available explanations are conspiracy theories. We could accept that the "Rightist-Trotskyite Bloc" was put on trial in 1938, but we could not allow ourselves to believe that they were either guilty or innocent, since both beliefs entail a conspiracy. (If they were guilty then there was a treasonable conspiracy of spies and wreckers at the heart of the Soviet State. If they were innocent, there was a tyrannical conspiracy on the part of Stalin and others to fabricate the appearance of conspiracy.) We could notice that a lot of communists were massacred in China in 1927, but we could not rationally suppose that Chiang had conspired to kill them, for that would be a conspiracy theory. We could accept that World War II took place, but not that the Nazis conspired to wage it since that would be a conspiracy theory. (Good news for some of the Nuremburg defendants!) We could accept that the Holocaust occurred but not that anyone, Hitler included, conspired to bring it about. Moreover, we would not even be allowed to investigate these questions, since any answer we came up with would be something we were not entitled to believe. If the conventional wisdom is correct, and we ought not to believe conspiracy theories, then history is bunk, since it is largely unbelievable, the kind of thing that we are rationally required not to believe. But history is not bunk. Much of it merits belief, and that includes the many conspiracy theories of which we have ample evidence. Thus the conventional wisdom is wrong and conspiracy theories need not be rejected simply because they are conspiracy theories.

#### Holo triv disad--The term Holocaust is anti-semetic in both semantic origin and historical use—the term So’ah better encapsulates the horror of the Nazi final solution without carrying the racist baggage

Agamben ’99 Giorgio Agamben, professor of philosophy at the university of Verona, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, 1999, pg. 28-31

1.10 The history of an incorrect term can also prove instructive. “Holocaust” is the scholarly transcription of the Latin holocaustumwhich, in turn, is a translation of the Greek term *holocaustos* (which is, however, an adjective, and which means “completely burned”; the corresponding Greek noun is *holocaust3ma*). The semantic history of the term is essentially Christian, since the Church Fathers used it to translate — in fact with neither rigour nor coherence — the complex sacrificial doctrine of the Bible (in particular, of Leviticus and Deuteronomy). Leviticus reduces all sacrifices to four fundamental types: olah, hattat, shelamin, minha*.* As Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert write in “The Nature and Function of Sacrifice,~~ The names of two of these are significant. The *hattat* was the sacri­fice employed especially to expiate the sin called *hauat* or *hataah,* the definition of which given in Leviticus is unfortunately extremely vague. The *shelamin* is a communion sacrifice, a sacrifice of thanks­giving, of alliance, of vows. As for the terms ‘olah and minha, they are purely descriptive. Each recalls one of the special operations of sacrifice: the latter, the presentation of the victim, if it is of veg­etable matter, the former, the dispatch of the offering to the divinity (Mauss and Hubert 1964: 16). The Vulgate usually translates *olah* by *holocaiustum (holocausti oblatlo); hattat* by *oblatlo; shelamin* by *hostia pac~Jicorum; minha* by *hostici pro pecca to.* The term holocaustum is transmitted from the Vulgate to the Latin Fathers, who used it primarily in the many commentaries of the Holy Writ to indicate the sacrifices of the Hebrews. (Thus in Hilarius, *In Psalmata,* 65, 23: *holocausta sunt inteqra hostiarum corpora, quia tota ad ignem sacrjicii defereban­tur, holocausta sunt nuncupata.)* Two points are particularly im­portant here. First, early on, the Church Fathers used the term in its literal sense as a polemical weapon against the Jews, to condemn the uselessness of bloody sacrifices (Tertullian’s text, which refers to Marcion, is exemplary: *Quid stultius. quam sacrificiorum cruentorum et holocaustomatum nidorosurum a dec exactic?* “What is more foolish than a god who demands bloody sacrifices and holocausts that smell of burnt remains?” *Adversus Marcionem* 5, 5; cf. also Augustine, *C. Faustusm,* 19, 4). Second, the term “holocaustum” is extended as a metaphor to include Christian martyrs, such that their torture is equated with sac­rifice (Hilarius, *In Psalmata,* 65, 23: *Martyres infidel testimonium corpora sua holocausta voverunt).* Christ’s sacrifice on the cross is thus ultimately defined as a holocaust (Augustine, *In Evang. Joah.,* 41, 5: *se in holocaustum obtulerit in cruce Jesus;* Rufinus, *Origines in Leviticum,* 1, *4: ho) ocaustum. carnis ejus per lignum crucis oblatum).* Thus begins the semantic migration by which the term “holo­caust” in vernacular languages gradually acquires the meaning of the “supreme sacrifice in the sphere of a complete devotion to sacred and superior motives:’ In English, the term appears in its literal sense in Tindale *(Mark* xii. 33: “A greater thynge than all holocaustes and sacrifises”) and H. More *(Apocal. Apoc.* 101: “In the latter part thereof stands the altar of Holocausts”). The term appears in its metaphorical sense in Bp. Alcock *(Mons Perfect* C lija: “Very true obedyence is an holocauste of martyrdom made to Cryste”). Beaumont *(Psyche* xxiv. cxciv: “The perfect holocaust of generous love”) and Milton, where it signifies a complete con­sumption by fire *(Samson* 1702: “Like that self-begotten bird In the Arabian woods embost, That no second knows nor third, And lay erewhile a Holocaust”). It is repeated, over and over again, through to the twentieth century (for example, *Hansard Commons* 6 March, 1940: “the general holocaust of civilized standards”) *(Oxford English Dictionary* 1989: 315). But the term’s usage in polemics against the Jews also has a history, even if it is a secret one not recorded by dictionaries. In the course of my research on sovereignty, I happened upon a pas­sage by a medieval chronicler that constitutes, to my knowledge, the first use of holocaust with reference to a massacre of Jews, in this case in a violently anti-Semitic fashion. Richard of Duizes tes­tifies that on the day of the coronation of Richard 1 (1189), the inhabitants of London engaged in a particularly bloody pogrom: “The very day of the coronation of the king, at about the hour in which the Son was burnt for the Father, they began in London to burn the Jews for their father the demon *(in coeptum est in civitate Londoniae immolare judaeos patri suo diabolo*); and the celebration of this mystery lasted so long that the holocaust could not be completed before the next day. And the other cities and towns of the region imitated the faith of the inhabitants of London and, with the same devotion, sent their bloodsuckers to hell *(pan devo­tione suas sanguisugas cum sanguine transmiserunt ad inferos)”* (Car­dini 1994: 131). Insofar as it implies the substitution of a literal expression with an attenuated or altered expression for something that one does not actually want to hear mentioned, the formation of a eu­phemism always involves ambiguities. In this case, however, the ambiguity is intolerable. The Jews also use a euphemism to indi­cate the extermination. They use the term so’ah, which means “devastation, catastrophe” and, in the Bible, often implies the idea of a divine punishment (as in Isaiah 10:3: “What will you do in the day of punishment, when the so’ah will come from afar?”). Even if Levi probably refers to this term when he speaks of the attempt to interpret the extermination as a punishment for our sins, his use of the euphemism contains no mockery. In the case of the term “holocaust,” by contrast, the attempt to establish a connection, however distant, between Auschwitz and the Biblical olah and between death in the gas chamber and the “complete devotion to sacred and superior motives” cannot but sound like a jest. Not only does the term imply an unacceptable equation between crematoria and altars; it also continues a semantic heredity that is from its inception anti-Semitic. This is why we will never make use of this term.

#### You presume the principle of “resistance” can be cleanly applied all the time – this displaces ethical attention to the specificity of every encounter and the way we can and should change from new experiences

Deleuze and Foucault ’72 Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power,” Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: selected essays and interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, recorded March 4, 1972, <http://libcom.org/library/intellectuals-power-a-conversation-between-michel-foucault-and-gilles-deleuze> yeah i edited this for some gendered language that was messed up - jss

GILLES DELEUZE: Possibly we're in the process of experiencing a new relationship between theory and practice. At one time, practice was considered an application of theory, a consequence; at other times, it had an opposite sense and it was thought to inspire theory, to be indispensable for the creation of future theoretical forms. In any event, their relationship was understood in terms of a process of totalisation. For us, however, the question is seen in a different light. The relationships between theory and practice are far more partial and fragmentary. On one side, a theory is always local and related to a limited field, and it is applied in another sphere, more or less distant from it. The relationship which holds in the application of a theory is never one of resemblance. Moreover, from the moment a theory moves into its proper domain, it begins to encounter obstacles, walls, and blockages which require its relay by another type of discourse (it is through this other discourse that it eventually passes to a different domain). Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another. No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall. For example, your work began in the theoretical analysis of the context of confinement, specifically with respect to the psychiatric asylum within a capitalist society in the nineteenth century. Then you became aware of the necessity for confined individuals to speak for themselves, to create a relay (it's possible, on the contrary, that your function was already that of a relay in relation to them); and this group is found in prisons -- these individuals are imprisoned. It was on this basis that you organised the information group for prisons (G.I.P.)(1), the object being to create conditions that permit the prisoners themselves to speak. It would be absolutely false to say, as the Maoist implied, that in moving to this practice you were applying your theories. This was not an application; nor was it a project for initiating reforms or an enquiry in the traditional sense. The emphasis was altogether different: a system of relays within a larger sphere, within a multiplicity of parts that are both theoretical and practical. A theorising intellectual, for us, is no longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness. Those who act and struggle are no longer represented, either by a group or a union that appropriates the right to stand as their conscience. Who speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts. All of us are "groupuscules."(2) Representation no longer exists; there's only action-theoretical action and practical action which serve as relays and form networks. FOUCAULT: It seems to me that the political involvement of the intellectual was traditionally the product of two different aspects of his activity: his position as an intellectual in bourgeois society, in the system of capitalist production and within the ideology it produces or imposes (his exploitation, poverty, rejection, persecution, the accusations of subversive activity, immorality, etc); and his proper discourse to the extent that it revealed a particular truth, that it disclosed political relationships where they were unsuspected. These two forms of politicisation did not exclude each other, but, being of a different order, neither did they coincide. Some were classed as "outcasts" and others as "socialists." During moments of violent reaction on the part of the authorities, these two positions were readily fused: after 1848, after the Commune, after 1940. The intellectual was rejected and persecuted at the precise moment when the facts became incontrovertible, when it was forbidden to say that the emperor had no clothes. The intellectual spoke the truth to those who had yet to see it, in the name of those who were forbidden to speak the truth: he was conscience, consciousness, and eloquence. In the most recent upheaval (3) the intellectual discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge: they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves. But there exists a system of power which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this discourse and this knowledge, a power not only found in the manifest authority of censorship, but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an entire societal network. Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of power-the idea of their responsibility for "consciousness" and discourse forms part of the system. The intellectual's role is no longer to place [herself] "somewhat ahead and to the side" in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform [her] into its object and instrument in the sphere of "knowledge," "truth," "consciousness," and "discourse. "(4) In this sense theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice. But it is local and regional, as you said, and not totalising. This is a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and insidious. It is not to "awaken consciousness" that we struggle (the masses have been aware for some time that consciousness is a form of knowledge; and consciousness as the basis of subjectivity is a prerogative of the bourgeoisie), but to sap power, to take power; it is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A "theory " is the regional system of this struggle.

#### Link turn--Conspiracy theory can be used to explain why white government has historically oppressed the Black Body

Husting 13 [Ginna Husting. "Once More, With Feeling: Conspiracy Theories, Contempt, and Affective Governmentality (forthcoming)" *Ethical Theory and Practice*. Ed. Olli Loukola. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi Press, 2013. AMB]

By far the largest area of current work is the study of the hidden causes behind constructing, believing in, and circulating conspiracy theories. This dietrological work constitutes the dominant form of commentary among academics (Bratich 2008) but also prevails among journalists and political bloggers. Such analyses ask why such theories are propagating now (usually citing the increase in media uses of the term over the past 20 years, and the 1997 first appearance of the term in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1997 Knight 02) as evidence of the rise of the problem). Answers range from the increasing deluge of digital information and the easy spread of rumor on the internet to increases in global governance and forms of capital which are confusing to everyday citizens. Finally, a whole swathe of this literature points to the characteristics of certain groups which are associated with “conspiracy thinking”—in U.S. conspiracy discourse, these consist of people in the Middle East, citizen of nondemocratic, non-Western nations, and communities of color in the United States. Some of this literature is racist and nationalist—posting the tribal mind of the Arab other as one which cannot grasp how democracy works. But much of this literature, when not overtly racist, is patronizing—a form of “these people aren’t crazy, just ignorant and backward given their history of oppression,” (Goertzel 1994; Simmons & Parsons 2005). Some is not—witness, for example, Kelman’s recent study of the reasonableness of African American stories framing the failure of the levee in New Orleans as intentional on the part of the Army Corps of Engineers (2009) His analysis demonstrates a history of intentional forms of sabotage from white government and corporate actors in taking, polluting, and weakening residential areas inhabited primarily by African Americans in Louisiana. Under such conditions, stories about the levee and flooding become not “crazy” but legitimate attempts to understand a confusing and difficult phenomenon.

#### No link, racism may explain a particular conspiracy but not all, means it’s a faulty epistemology and can’t solve the aff

Uscinksi and Parent 11 [Uscinski, Joseph E., and Joseph M. Parent. "Conspiracy Theories Are for Losers." *American Political Science Association Annual Conference* (2011): n. pag. Print. AMB]

Nonetheless, scholars have a poor understanding of the conditions under which conspiracies ¶ resonate. This is likely because the extant literature is temporally parochial, relying almost ¶ exclusively on anecdotes drawn from a handful of salient, usually contemporaneous cases.1¶ For ¶ example, Michael Tesler and David Sears argue that “the driving force behind the dogged ¶ unwillingness of so many to acknowledge that Obama was born in the United States is not just ¶ simple partisan opposition to a Democratic president but a general ethnocentric suspicion of an ¶ African-American president who is also perceived as distinctly ‘other’” (2010:153). Many blamed ¶ the 9/11 “truther” movement on un-American attitudes (O'Reilly 2006) or “massive growth in free ¶ expression facilitated by online forums and weblogs” (Heins 2007:797). However, these ad hoc ¶ explanations are not set in comparative context and may have little explanatory power beyond the ¶ event each is meant to explain racism, for instance, would likely not explain belief in either the ¶ truther or JFK conspiracy theories. A lack of systematic evidence has stunted the growth of general ¶ theories to explain and predict conspiratorial thinking. In consequence, policymakers have been ¶ largely left in the dark